Theme[1]
What impression has Russia’s presence and affect within the Southern Neighbourhood had on the resilience of nations within the area and the Atlantic Alliance?
Abstract
Russia has a technique of destabilising Europe’s Southern Neighbourhood.[2] The technique is opportunistic, sensible, instrumental and articulated via the prism of the conflict in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s technique is instrumental in 4 methods: (1) Moscow is fulfilling the target of frightening the dispersion of Western consideration and sources within the context of the conflict in Ukraine; (2) it helps authoritarian regimes within the Center East, North Africa and the Sahel via defence agreements; (3) it makes use of disinformation campaigns primarily based on narratives about how the ‘World Majority’ (the ‘World South’) is oppressed by the ‘Collective West’ (the US, the EU and NATO); and (4) the Kremlin’s instrumental technique is recognized with a type of alignment and strategic partnership with different revisionist powers, akin to Iran, China and North Korea.
Russia has encountered strong deterrence and containment on the Atlantic Alliance’s japanese entrance and has intensified its presence within the Southern Neighbourhood seeking alternatives to extend its political and army affect. US non-intervention in Syria (in 2013, over the usage of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad’s regime) and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan (2021) had been perceived by Moscow as a US weak spot within the area and an absence of deterrence.
Russia’s presence and affect within the Southern Neighbourhood is a part of the ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’. The Nice Recreation of the 19th century pitted Britain towards Russia. The 21st century’s Nice Recreation 2.0 consists of many extra gamers and takes place primarily in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
Evaluation
The Center East, North Africa and the Sahel: some commonalities
There are a lot of variations between North Africa, the Center East and the Sahel by way of the broader geopolitical context and how much menace they pose to NATO, however they share some frequent options, because the areas are present process a profound means of transformation of the regional order, formed by the disaster of central authority and state legitimacy, whereas the autocratic state mannequin is unsustainable and the trail to democracy is tortuous. The results of the disaster of legitimacy are quite a few: (a) the decomposition of a number of states (Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen); (b) the emergence of ‘sub-states’ whose legitimacy is predicated on ‘blood loyalties’ (tribes, ethnic/non secular teams, clans, and so forth); (c) the progress of various radical jihadist teams; and (d) the fracturing of Sunni jihadism into two most important opposing factions, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). The gradual withdrawal of the US, France and the EU from the areas has fostered an influence vacuum that’s being stuffed by Russia and China, in addition to by Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, North Africa and the Sahel have turn into new theatres of rigidity and geostrategic competitors between the good powers, as has been the case within the Center East for a very long time.
Russia’s world geopolitical objectives
Since 2007, when Vladimir Putin on the Munich Safety Convention publicly outlined the US and NATO as the best threats to Russia’s safety and defence, Russian politicians have made no secret of the objectives of their geopolitical agenda: to create a post-liberal (‘post-Western’ or ‘multipolar’) world order, ie, to undermine US and Western energy and management; to regain nice energy standing with the intention to management and defend its financial and pure sources; and, because the conflict in Ukraine (2014), to upstage the failure of Western makes an attempt to isolate Russia internationally.
Russia’s presence and affect within the Southern Neighbourhood is a part of the ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’. The Nice Recreation of the 19th century pitted Britain towards Russia. Past the quick battlefield of Afghanistan, the query was: who will dominate Central and South Asia, from the Caspian Sea to the Himalayas and the highway to India? It was basic geopolitics. The ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’ of the 21st century entails many extra gamers and takes place in lots of extra territories.
It’s a recreation of rivalry between liberal democracies that search to guard the worldwide liberal order and revisionist powers that search to alter or destroy it. The construction of the Nice Recreation 2.0 is triangular:[3] it consists of a contest between Westerners and revisionists for energy and affect in African, Latin American and Asian international locations. These international locations, which reject the thought of belonging to a single bloc –whether or not led by the US or by a rising alignment between China and Russia– are ready to diversify their companions and allies. The ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’ is who shall be extra able to constructing alliances in Eurasia, Africa and Latin America: the liberal democracies or the revisionist powers?
Russia’s objectives, methods and instruments: the Center East and North Africa
The turning level for Russia’s presence within the Center East was its army intervention in Syria in 2015. The Kremlin’s intervention was meant to fulfil a number of goals on the regional stage: growing its arms gross sales, preserving inner safety within the nation whereas preserving safety in its periphery, and changing into an influence dealer between the West and the area and among the many international locations of the area. A very powerful purpose was to assist and keep Bashar al-Assad’s regime in energy, an goal that Russia has greater than fulfilled. The Kremlin justified its intervention in Syria on the grounds that Assad had requested for its assist, however above all by the ‘want’ to convey order to the chaos that US interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, and its assist for ‘terrorists’ (the opposition to Assad’s regime)[4] had provoked. The conflict in Ukraine performed the function of a catalyst that accelerated some previous processes in Russia’s relations with the area, however right now (2024) Moscow’s geopolitical objectives on the world and regional stage are the identical as in 2015, with one essential addition: Moscow is fulfilling the purpose of frightening the dispersion of Western consideration and sources within the context of the conflict on the Japanese entrance of the Alliance.
Russia doesn’t have a grand technique for the area within the sense of a coherent long-term plan to order nationwide pursuits and devise reasonable strategies to attain them. However as a deeply opportunistic geopolitical actor, Moscow has a transparent imaginative and prescient of its pursuits in particular conditions inside the area. This strategy to regional politics acts as a sensible and instrumentalist technique, consisting of the flexibility to improvise and adapt rapidly to altering circumstances. The evolving relationship between Russia and Iran is an efficient instance of the Kremlin’s instrumental technique.
The strategic alliance between Russia and Iran
Russia’s army intervention within the Syrian conflict in 2015 accelerated army cooperation between Russia and Iran towards US targets. Russia was then coordinating its Armed Forces (AF) and the Wagner Group paramilitaries with Hezbollah. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has turned their relationship right into a strategic partnership. Within the ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’, Iran and Russia, along with China, are a part of a united entrance (although not bodily) towards the US and the West, as will be seen within the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and within the strategic rivalry between China and the US within the Indo-Pacific over the standing of Taiwan. United by a standard enemy (the US), the trio shouldn’t be an alliance and they don’t use the identical instruments to attain their objectives (Iran and Russia use standard army drive, whereas China’s instruments are primarily financial), however they’re aligning their overseas coverage. All three aspire to create a multipolar world order that’s not dominated by the US and thus fulfil their ambition to turn into the hegemonic powers of their respective areas. All three international locations are members of the BRICS. Bilateral commerce between them is rising; plans are being drawn up for tariff-free blocs, new cost methods –de-dollarisation– and commerce routes that bypass Western-controlled areas.[5] Western sanctions, first on Iran after which Russia, have led these two international locations plus China to create another oil market, the place funds are denominated in Chinese language foreign money. This oil is commonly transported by ‘darkish fleet’ tankers that function exterior maritime laws and take steps to hide their operations.[6]
Moscow, which joined the sanctions regime towards Tehran within the 2010s in an effort to curtail its nuclear programme, has begun to guard Iran diplomatically and increase its funding within the nation’s financial system. Prior to now two years, Moscow has intensified its ties with the community of Iranian companions and proxies that stretches from Lebanon to Iraq. Because the begin of the Gaza conflict, Russia has stepped up its diplomatic assist for Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis, defending their actions on the UN and blaming the US for his or her assaults. Moscow tries to deal with this diplomatic assist delicately, as a result of it aspires to take care of ties with the Persian Gulf Arab international locations in addition to Israel, so it can’t afford to supply Iranian-linked teams limitless backing. Russia continues to take a position closely in its ties with Gulf states akin to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which have offered vital financial advantages to the Kremlin, however have a hostile relationship with their Iranian proxies.
Though the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are very totally different from one another, they’ve three factors in frequent: (1) each Russia and Iran are revisionist powers that aspire to alter the worldwide liberal order, and turn into the hegemonic powers of their areas; (2) the US helps Ukraine and Israel militarily (arms and intelligence); and (3) Iran helps Russia and Hamas, Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis and varied radical militias combating Israel and US targets in Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and the Purple Sea in the identical manner.
Iran’s provide of Shaheed assault drones to be used in Ukraine has obtained a lot consideration. However what Russia is offering Iran –Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and helicopters– deserves no less than as a lot consideration. Iran stays a significant menace to the Gulf states, and supplying Su-35s to Iran would shift the army steadiness inside the area in Iran’s favour. However even when the deal doesn’t materialise, a pattern of strategic cooperation has already emerged, together with bilateral Russian-Iranian and multilateral Russian-Chinese language-Iranian workout routines, a sample that goes again no less than 5 years.
Instruments
The Russian presence within the Southern Neighbourhood is a part of a mixture of synchronous actions: the reactivation of networks established through the Chilly Struggle, political and enterprise diplomacy within the nuclear and pure useful resource sectors and ‘army diplomacy’: defence agreements, the incorporation of the paramilitary Wagner Group (now the ‘African Corps’) into the Russian armed forces and disinformation campaigns.
Sahel
Since 2012, when the Tuaregs rebelled for the fifth time towards the federal government in Bamako (Mali) with the assistance of al-Qaeda Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and different jihadist teams, the central Sahel area has been the scene of political violence, armed conflicts and civil clashes resulting in seven army coups: between 2020 and 2021 within the Sudan, Guinea and Mali (two coups), Chad (2021), Burkina-Faso (two coups in 2022), Niger (2023) and Gabon (2023).
This excessive political instability is the results of a confluence of a number of components: poverty, inhabitants displacements brought on by local weather change, tribal rivalries between sedentary, nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, the dominance of organised crime mafias, the weak spot and disaster of legitimacy of state establishments, the consolidation of jihadist and different terrorist teams, drug trafficking and endemic corruption.
Regional and worldwide mechanisms, such because the Financial Neighborhood of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations Multidimensional Built-in Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), whose mission ends in September 2024, and the 2 EU missions –EUCAP (EU Capability Constructing Mission) and EUTM (EU Coaching Mission), which finish in Might 2024 with out a consensus amongst European international locations for renewal–, in addition to the bilateral actions of France (the counter-terrorist Serval and Barkhane operations) and the US in Niger (an airbase in Agadez) have failed to stop instability from spreading. Sahelian international locations share an anti-French sentiment, however not all are anti-Western.
Following the coups, army juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso have requested France to withdraw its troops, and Niger, in March 2024, has executed the identical with the US. France’s counter-terrorism strategy, which was meant to be complete in stabilising the area, didn’t forestall, as an example, the collapse in elements of Burkina Faso and Mali of important providers (together with well being care and training), nor a number of the bloodiest inter-ethnic combating.
The Russian penetration within the area started as a consequence of the French determination to withdraw its forces from CAR in 2017, at a time when armed teams remained energetic and managed a lot of the territory. Russia obtained a number of army and financial agreements with the CAR authorities as a ‘stabilising drive’, after which perpetuated this mannequin within the Sahel.
The presence of a number of Islamist terrorist teams within the Sahel –the most important in Mali are al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)), the Islamic State within the Larger Sahara (ISGS) and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); whereas in Burkina Faso it’s Ansaroul Islam (AI) and in Niger ISGS and Boko Haram which can be current– is the consequence of two most important developments: (1) the civil conflict in Libya that has been happening since 2011, with the nation, as a failed state, exporting weapons and radicals; and (2) of the West’s profitable battle towards terrorism within the Center East and North Africa. Defeated in these areas, radicals have moved south to the Sahel.
Jihadism had flourished within the Center East and North Africa as a result of it has discovered a beneficial cultural and political context (Arab communities, a literate inhabitants, a wealth of pure sources and spiritual fanaticism). Within the case of the Sahel, there isn’t a beneficial context: there’s a lot poverty and a big illiterate inhabitants (who can’t learn the Koran). Consequently, jihadists establish their radicalisation targets with the varied ethnic teams and clans and are thus turn into straight concerned in inter-ethnic conflicts. Their relative success is because of their technique of ‘proudly owning’ the objectives of native ethnicities, introduced as companions in a win-win relationship.
The EU, led by France, and the US haven’t translated their appreciable financial funding into an equal political and army affect.[7] It’s because native actors have embraced their very own function within the ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’ by adopting a technique of diversifying their diplomatic, financial and, above all, army alliances. Native leaders’ notion that Russia has largely succeeded in defending Bashar al-Assad and his regime in Syria and that it has been profitable in combating the Islamic State within the Center East has sparked their curiosity in asking Moscow for a similar favour. These developments, together with Moscow’s disinformation campaigns on colonialism and neo-decolonisation, have facilitated Russian penetration within the area. Russia and China are filling the vacuum left by the West because of the methods of native actors to diversify their companions. Russia has gained floor primarily within the army and diplomatic spheres, whereas China has strengthened its place as a dominant financial energy, investing in infrastructure, pure sources and different financial initiatives.
Russia’s goals, methods and instruments within the Sahel
The Sahel shouldn’t be a precedence for Russia’s nationwide safety, however it’s a precedence for its overseas coverage, as a result of it’s a part of the ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’. Its most important goal is to assist its purchasers, the army juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, which have requested its help. Diplomatically, Russia’s total purpose is to win extra assist for its imaginative and prescient of a multipolar world order. On the UN, Moscow lobbies its African allies for beneficial votes on points such because the Ukraine battle and works to sow mistrust in UN peacekeeping missions and different multilateral efforts.
Russia has no political preferences within the Sahel. Its technique is instrumental and its most important purpose is ‘to go towards the West’. Moscow’s objectives and methods within the area are the identical as within the Syrian conflict: regime safety and the battle towards terrorism/political opponents and towards US and European pursuits.
To go towards Western pursuits is Russia’s most important technique, by means of a discrete plan of defence agreements with the international locations of the area. That is its modus operandi: first it arranges army offers and arms gross sales, then it sends technicians to take care of weapons, subsequently it supplies ‘army advisors’ and, lastly, it makes an attempt to shut financial offers. For now, there isn’t a proof of financial offers within the Sahel, however Russia’s ambition is most definitely to revenue from Mali’s and Niger’s minerals (respectively lithium and uranium).
Russia’s most important instruments within the Sahel are army: the Armed Forces, Spetsnaz (Particular Forces), the GRU (Army Intelligence Service), the Wagner Group (now referred to as the ‘African Corps’) and disinformation campaigns. Russia’s financial funding within the area may be very low; its presence and affect within the area is neither broad nor deep, however its relative success is because of historic ties relationship again to the Soviet period, Russia’s ‘peer’ remedy of native actors (Moscow doesn’t lecture on democracy, human rights or democratic reforms as a situation for its assist), however above all due to native leaders’ notion of the Westerners’ failure to resolve their issues of poverty, corruption, famine and, above all, inter-ethnic conflicts that overlap with jihadist violence.
Russia’s impression on the resilience of nations within the Southern Neighbourhood
In keeping with the dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, the phrase ‘resilience’ connotes ‘the flexibility of a residing being to adapt to a disturbing agent or an adversarial state or scenario’. The consequence of the ‘adaptation’ of the international locations of the Southern Neighbourhood to the disruptive function of each Russia and terrorist teams has been the expulsion of Western international locations from the area. Moscow, by offering army and political assist to the army juntas and thru disinformation campaigns on the function of former colonialist powers and the US within the area, local weather change, and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, is increasing its affect, sowing confusion and anti-Western sentiment. There’s a robust hyperlink between the extent of disinformation and the instability it has precipitated. Disinformation campaigns have promoted and validated army coups, intimidated members of civil society into silence and served as smokescreens for corruption and exploitation. Almost 60% of disinformation campaigns on the continent are sponsored by overseas states, with Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Qatar being the principle sponsors. Russia stays the principle supplier of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns focusing on greater than 22 international locations. This accounts for nearly 40% of all disinformation campaigns in Africa.[8]
Determine 1. Regional map of disinformation in Africa
Russia’s impression on the Atlantic Alliance’s resilience
Russia’s increasing affect in Africa and the Center East threatens Europe’s stability. Ongoing instability in these areas fuels a steadily rising arms market, which may show helpful for Russia in circumventing Western sanctions. Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Libya and the Sudan are the most important recipients of Russian arms exports on the continent, however the variety of African international locations shopping for arms from the Kremlin has been rising over the previous twenty years. Russia has asserted its affect in three main battle zones: Syria, Libya and the Sahel. When mixed with Russia’s entry to Center Japanese ports, together with the Syrian port of Tartus, Russia’s unbridled affect in Libya and its rising presence within the Sahel, together with the Sudan, give it a stronger place from which to disrupt NATO’s maritime actions in occasions of disaster. By securing entry to African ports alongside the Purple Sea via the Port of Sudan, and with prospects of securing entry to the Libyan port of Tobruk, Russia could be ready to disrupt naval and maritime passage alongside the central and japanese Mediterranean and to ascertain coastal airfields that may allow the worldwide transit of Russian plane, together with army plane. With larger affect in Libya and the Sahel, Russia additionally good points entry to 2 key migration and human trafficking routes in Africa, which to date there isn’t a proof it has used. This places Russia in a stronger place to impress humanitarian and political crises in Europe in occasions of hostility.[9]
Nonetheless, Russia shouldn’t be the principle menace to the Alliance within the Southern Neighbourhood. Its presence and affect is a part of the ‘Nice Recreation 2.0’. Russia is a geopolitical menace from which the Alliance’s safety issues derive. The principle menace within the Center East is Iran and its ambition to turn into a hegemonic energy within the area, in addition to its alignment with different revisionist powers, notably China and Russia. The largest menace in North Africa is the unlikely however not unattainable battle between Morocco and Algeria. Though the 2 international locations are probably the most secure within the area, rigidity between them is rising (they broke off diplomatic relations in 2021, have a battle over the Western Sahara and have had closed borders since 1994). The principle menace within the Sahel is that the entire area may turn into an enormous failed state and/or the bottom for a brand new Islamic State.
Conclusions
Some suggestions
There’s a clear asymmetry between the size and character of the threats to NATO’s safety within the East and South. The menace on the Japanese entrance is decided by Russia and is standard and hybrid. NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood has not left behind its structural vulnerability. Transnational phenomena akin to terrorism, organised crime, small arms proliferation and irregular migration flows will be anticipated to stay among the many most important components of instability and insecurity within the South.[10] As Luis Simón has identified, NATO’s goals within the South haven’t modified considerably by way of selling stability within the neighbourhood, thought-about a elementary key to Euro-Atlantic safety. What has modified is the strategic context and the character of the threats and challenges emanating from the South. The character of NATO’s technique for the South subsequently must be readapted via no less than three avenues: (1) a 360-degree deterrence; (2) ‘superior resilience’; and (3) a transatlantic division of labour for disaster administration.[11]
A hypothetical Hamas victory within the Gaza conflict could be the start line for a reconfiguration of the regional order, making it all of the extra essential for the US, Israel and Arab allies (primarily Saudi Arabia and Jordan) to take care of a steadiness of regional energy and stop an Iranian victory. A hypothetical conflict in North Africa, or the conversion of the Sahel into a significant failed state/Islamic State, would enhance the impression of the aforementioned instability components and dangers for the Alliance within the Southern Neighbourhood. NATO should be ready for worst-case situations.[12]
Simón means that NATO must embrace a transition to a extra oblique function in stability projection. This actuality pertains to the rising idea of ‘ahead resilience’, which entails strengthening the capabilities of NATO’s companions to withstand pressures from adversaries and tackle challenges akin to terrorism, organised crime and the consequences of local weather change. The ahead resilience technique should prioritise and provides a distinguished function to NATO’s companions, together with on this new paradigm each regional actors and different related entities, and particularly the EU. Companions’ native wants transcend the safety area. NATO should transfer away from its uniform strategy to partnerships and undertake a extra tailor-made, versatile and bilateral framework of interactions with international locations within the area.[13]
The keys to a future Western presence within the Sahel area ought to deal with 4 factors:
- Unity of motion: any complete and consensual strategy to the brand new Sahelian actuality should harmonise the pursuits of the international locations on NATO’s southern borders and on the multilateral and European Atlantic (NATO) ranges. This motion may begin with bilateral contacts by international locations which have a superb picture within the area (Germany and Spain particularly) as EU and UN missions come to an finish this yr. The principle goals of renewing the European presence within the area needs to be to assist native democratic forces, to enhance intelligence sharing, and to have a realistic strategy to the area by discovering a steadiness between the calls for of democratic values and the native realities of poverty and battle, which are sometimes extra pressing to resolve. This implies making a mechanism to manage investments that disappear as a consequence of corruption. Within the case of the Center East, minilateralism (advert hoc native alliances) may work as demonstrated by the united response of the US, France, the UK, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel to Iran’s assault.
- Reconciliation and dialogue: with a view to restoring political and safety stability, the West ought to promote nationwide processes of dialogue and reconciliation between communities and ethnic teams/clans.
- Endogenous growth: there’s a want to advertise endogenous capacities for financial growth, with monetary and funding assist mechanisms tailor-made to native wants.
- Struggle for hearts and minds: earlier than any profitable technique to battle Islamist terrorism and organised crime mafias, in addition to the malign affect of Russia and different actors, it’s essential to win the assist of the native inhabitants.
It is very important discover methods to take care of the Western presence within the area, as a result of it will likely be very tough to return if expelled from the area, however above all as a result of it’s the key to the resilience of regional international locations and NATO, in addition to to the Alliance’s 360º deterrence.
[1] This paper is predicated on a broader evaluation introduced by the writer to the Resilience Committee on the HQ NATO (unclassified assembly) on 19/IV/2024.
[2] On the idea of the Southern Neighbourhood see Luis Simón & Vivien Pertusot (2017), ‘Making sense of Europe’s Southern Neighbourhood: the principle geopolitical and safety parameters’, Elcano Royal Institute, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/making-sense-of-europes-southern-neighbourhood-main-geopolitical-and-security-parameters/.
[3] Robin Niblett describes the competitors between the US and China for the World South as triangular in his ebook The New Chilly Struggle. How the competition between the US and China will form our century, Atlantic Books, London, 2024.
[4] Extra particulars on Russia’s function in Siria in:Mira Milosevich-Juaristi (2017), ‘La finalidad estratégica de Rusia en Siria y las perspectivas de cumplimiento del acuerdo de Astaná’, Elcano Royal Institute, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-finalidad-estrategica-de-rusia-en-siria-y-las-perspectivas-de-cumplimiento-del-acuerdo-de-astana/.
[5] ‘How China, Russia and Iran are forging nearer ties’, The Economist, 18/III/2024, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/03/18/how-china-russia-and-iran-are-forging-closer-ties.
[6] ‘The axis of evasion: behind China’s oil commerce with Iran and Russia’, The Atlantic Council, 28/III/2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-axis-of-evasion-behind-chinas-oil-trade-with-iran-and-russia/.
[7] Mira Milosevich-Juaristi (2023), ‘Rusia en África y las posibles repercusiones para España’, Coverage Paper, Actual Instituto Elcano, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/policy-paper/rusia-en-africa-y-las-posibles-repercusiones-para-espana/
[8] Africa Middle for Strategic Research (2024), ‘Mapping a surge of disinformation in Africa’, https://africacenter.org/highlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/.
[9] Daniel Kim (2024), ‘Arms race alert: world army spending hits file $2.4 trillion’, https://viewusglobal.com/world/article/61178/.
[10] Luis Simón & Piere Morcos (2022), ‘La OTAN y el Sur tras Ucrania’, Actual Instituto Elcano, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-otan-y-el-sur-tras-ucrania/.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.